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Some physicians and hospital
administrators view the law as
obstructing medical progress and
destroying the doctor-patient relationship. l This perception is
fostered by civil medical malpractice litigation which is viewed by
many as unfair. 2 Less frequently
a significant criminal case against
a physician, such as the 1975 Boston case in which a physician was
tried for manslaughter for failing
to attempt to preserve the " life"
of a fetus during a legal abortion,
will arouse both resentment and
fear in the medical community ..1
These attitudes toward the law
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and lawyers are both unfortunate
and unnecessary. The legal system is nothing more (or less)
than a system for resolving conflicts and making difficult decisions, and the major aim of legal
counseling is usually preventive.
It is to predict major problems
that might arise from a given
course of action, and suggest ways
that such problems might be either avoided or lessened.
In an area as complex as intensive care for the critically ill, the
prudent physician and hospital
administrator will seek legal advice before introducing novel approaches to decision-making concerning treatment or termination
of treatment. While the law cannot, and should not presume to,
answer the question of what doe ~:
or does not constitute proper
medical care in the ICU, the law
can be extremely helpful to thp
physician by identifying those aspects of the decision-making process that affect the patient's legal
rights.
The "patient rights movement"
in this country, if one can be said
to truly exist, is of relatively recent origin and exists as an offshoot of the consumer movement
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in our society. The movement is
founded on two fundamental
propositions: (1) the American
medical consumer possesses certain interests , many of which may
be properly described as legal
rights, that he does not automatically forfeit by entering into
a relationship with a physician or
health care facility ; and (2) most
physicians and health care facilities fail to recognize the existence
of these rights and interests, fail
to provide for their protection or
assertion , and frequently limit
their exercise without recourse for
the patient. 4 . ,i
Because a sick person's first
concern is to regain his health ,
he is usually willing to give up
rights that otherwise would be
vigorously asserted. The sicker a
person is, the more willing he is
to permit others unlimited control over his body. The intensive
care unit may be the place in the
hospital where the patient is most
easily denied any participation in
decision-making abo ut his future.
Because the dangers of loss of
autonomy and privacy are greatest in this setting, the obligations
of the physician and staff of the
unit to preserve the patient's legal and human rights are perhaps
more compelling than in any other hospital setting.
From the patient's perspective,
his first wish is usually either to
recover, or, if that is impossible,
to continue to live with the least
pain, disfigurement and disability
possible. The price of continued
life, in terms of economics, pain,
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disability, probability of recovery,
or any other criteria relevant to
the patient, may, however, be too
high for an individual. In such
cases discontinuance of active
treatment may be sought by the
patient or his family. It is my
view that the wishes of the mentally competent ad u I t patient
should always be honored by the
hospital staff, provided that he
has discussed the implications of
his wi she s with his physician.
If a classification system, such
as 0 n e discussed elsewhere in
this issue (in which patients are
g r 0 u p e d into four categories,
each of which calls for degrees of
medical e f for t ranging from
" maximal" to "discontinuance of
all life support assistance and
therapy") , serves both to enhance
the patient's role in decisionmaking about his treatment, and
improve or at least not downgrade
t he quality of ffio.3dical care he receives, then i ~8 ;lltroduction is a
step in the right direction. If, on
the other hand, such a system
deprives the patient of what litle
voice he now has in medical decision-making, its introduction
should be strenuously opposed.
Without having directly participated in the types of decisions
necessitated by a "triage" classification scheme in the intensive
care unit, my initial judgment is
that such a scheme contains both
the potential for great good and
the potential for great abuse.
Rather than minutely dissecting
all the potential legal issues
raised by such a system, I will
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deal with the four which strike
me as the most important in implementing such a system of patient care classification in an
intensive care unit: proper authority, proper documentation ,
adequate prediction criteria, and
adequate representation of the
patient's desires and interests in
the decision-making process.
Proper Authority
A number of court cases during
the past decade have enunciated
a doctrine of corporate liability
in the hospital field. This doctrine is essentially that the hospital may be held liable in a
malpractice suit for the actions
not only of its employees but also
of the physicians it permits to
practice me d i c i n e within its
walls.6 The basis of this finding is
that the board of directors of the
hospital has both the authority
and the duty to supervise medical
practice wit h i n the hospital.
Therefore if a patient is injured
because an unqualified or consistently careless physician is permitted to treat him , both the
physician and the hospital are
responsible to the patient. In one
notorious case a hospital failed to
revoke a physician's staff privileges even though it could have
discovered, had it performed a
proper review of patient records,
that the physician was performing unnecessary laminectomies
that were resulting in permanent
disabilities to a number of his
patients.7
Because the ultimate legal responsibility rests with the board
of directors of the hospital, it is
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essential that this body formally
approve any systematic deviance
from what would otherwise be
"standard" medical treatment.
Because medical expertise rests
with the medical staff, approval
of the executive board of the
medical staff should also be required. Since the success of any
such system demands complete
cooperation and concurrence of
t hose in charge of the ICU, the
approval of those in charge of this
unit should also be sought. In
providing for these formal approvals, the Tagge proposal is to
be commended. Even with these
"policy" approvals, however, it
might be appropriate for the protocol to be reviewed and approved
by the hospital's human studies
committee.
Proper Documentation
The importance of good data
keeping in any study is elementary. If good data is not kept the
ethics of conducting the study
are immediately called into question, and the pro b a b il i t Y of
attaining significant and convincing results is diminished. These
observations apply to the ICU
classification scheme.
Legally, there is no excuse for
not entering important treatment
decisions and orders in the patient's permanent record. The
AMA unequivocally recommends
that an order not to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation be
entered directly in the patient's
progress notes and also indicated
"on the physician's order sheet
for the benefit of nurses and other personnel who may be called
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upon to initiate 01' participate in
cardiopulmonary resuscitation." ~
In striking contrast, the policy on
classification at the Massachusetts General Hospital is that
"such orders as 'Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)', etc., should be
communicated directly verbally
to the nursing and house staff,
and should be registered in the
nursing notes, but not written
into the regular order sheet or permanent record." (emphasis supplied) 9 At this particular hospital
such nursing notes are routinely
destroyed following the patient's
death or discharge (a procedure
permitted under Massachusetts
law) so that the only purpose of
such a policy seems to be to destroy any evidence that the doctor ever gave such an order or
that the hospital would ever approve such an order. As a policy,
this covert method of medical
practice may be coun terproductive (i.e., some nurses or house
staff members may not learn of
the verbal order and so attempt
resuscitation). Moreover, it indicates that those implementing
the classifica tion system do not
really believe that what they are
doing is right or legal, or that
they have been given the propel'
authority to do it. Such a policy
thus calls the entire classification
method into serious question. Nor
is it an effective way to avoid any
legal consequences that might be
feared, since the nursing and
house staff can be compelled to
appear as witnesses in both civil
and criminal cases, and can testify to the verbal order. Also, if
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the system is functioning properly, the order will not be kept
secret from the surviving family,
since they should have had (with
the competent patient's consent)
a part in making this decision
themselves!
Adequate Prediction Criteria
The law is very skeptical about
man's ability to predict death. In
one recent case involving estate
taxes, for example, the tax tables
had put a 75 year-old woman's
life expectancy at 6 years. The
IRS attempted, with medical testimony, to prove that her "actual" life expectancy was less
than a year since she was suffering from cancel' of the colon which
had metastasized to the liver, a
disease all agreed was both fatal
and incurable. A number of physicians testified at the trial concerning the woman's actual life
expectancy. One cancer expert
said "I do not believe you can
place a time span on her expected
length of life ... [IJ had at least
one case who has lived six years
now with liver metastasis."
Another cancer expert, this one
called by the IRS, testified that
the deceased "could have lived
for a year," but added "in medicine you can't be too didactic,
beql.Use someone always surpris~s
you." A third physician, an internist, put her life expectancy
at one to six months. The court
found that on the basis of this
testimony the range of predictable life was between one month
and at least six years (absent
clinical signs of imminent death),
and that determination of actual
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life expectancy, even by experts,
would be " little better than a
guess." IU
Not only are courts unlikely to
accept non-unanimous me d i cal
views of imminent death, they are
also likely to place a high value
on even very slim chances of survival. Courts have required ship
owners to make rea son a b 1e
searches for persons who have
fallen overboard, eve n where
chances of recovery are negligible.
In one case a seaman was not
discovered missing until five and
one half hours after he had last
been seen. The captain refused to
reverse course and search, arguing that there was almost no
chance he was still alive. The
court found against the captain
saying "Once the evidence sustains a reasonable possibility of
rescue, ample or narrow, according to the circumstances, total
disregard of the duty, refusal to
make even a try, as was t he case
here, imposes liability."11 As one
commentator approvingly noted,
"it is ancient learning that 'a
drowning man cannot pull himself
out by his own hair,' and a 2%
chance of rescue as opposed to a
98 % chance of survival is proportionately t hat much more
precious." 12
A recent New York malpractice case approved a similar finding by a jury against a physician
and a hospital. The physician had
ordered a drug, Naturetin, which
was necessary to reduce the patient's blood pressure so that she
could undergo surgery. For some
reason the drug was not admin120

istered, the operation could not
be performed, and the patient
died. There was testimony that,
even without the surgery, the administration of the drug as prescribed would have given the
woman a 2% chance of survival.
The jury specifically did not find
negligence in the failure to perform the surgery, but based its
award of $70,000 solely on the
negligent denial of a 2% chance
of survival. u
The lesson of these cases is
clear. No decision should be made
to terminate treatment of a patient without the patient's competent, understanding and voluntary consent unless there is no
chance of survival. If there is any
measureable chance of survival,
even as little as one or two percent, the legal duty of the staff of
the intensive care unit would
seem to be to exercise alI" of their
skills to give their patient the full
benefit of that chance. Reversing
nature's processes and saving the
previously unsaveable is, after all,
what intensive care treatment is
all about. By operating such a
unit the hospital takes upon itself a higher duty of medical care
for the critically ill than it would
have without such a unit.
Adequate Patient Representation
In life and death decisionmaking about individual patients
it is essential that the patient's
interests be adequately represented. It should be readily apparent
that no patient in an ICU can
properly represent his own position - either for vigorous con tinued treatment or for cessation
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of treatment. Nor are members
of his immediate family usually
in a position to knowledgeably
and effectively champion the
rights and desires of the critically
ill patient.
In a court proceeding, where
decisions will be made about a
person who is unable to represent
his own interests (e.g., for reasons of age, mental incompeten cY), the court will appoint a
"guardian. " The guardian's job
is to represent the interests of the
minor or incompetent in the legal
proceedings. I suggest that any
time categorization decisions are
going to be made in staff rounds
or recommended by an advisory
group, the patient be represented
in all such deliberations by a person whom I term a "patient rights
advocate."!· The advocate's duty
is to make those arguments that
the patient would were he physically or mentally able to represent his own interests. The
advocate should be named by the
patient, but could also be a member of the advisory group specifically designated for such a
role. The advocate's only loyalty,
however, must be to the patient
and the advocate's only duty
must be to represent the patient's
interests as best he or she carl. As
an example, the advocate should
ensure that decisions are only
based on relevant criteria, and
never on such considerations as
race or ability to pay.
In the event that the patient is
comatose and has not indicated
a prior wish against heroics (e.g.,
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through a living will) the advucate should be required to assume
that the patient wants all reasonable medical steps taken to
preserve his life, and argue for the
position accordingly . Only with
such strong presentation of the
arguments in favor of continuing
treatment can the treating physician, the ICU staff, or the advisory committee to the ICU,
have any confidence that they
have considered all the reasonable
arguments in favor of the patient's desires. If treatment is
terminated without providing the
patient with the benefit of such
an advocate, the patient effectively loses any independent voice in
the decision-making process about
his future. The entire proposed
classification scheme then becomes little better than if decisions were left to the individual
attending physician.
Summary
The law and legal analysis of
decision-making processes can
playa positive role in promoting
patient rights without retarding
potential medical advances. To
achieve both of these goals any
system of patient classification
that determines treatment or nontreatment in an Intensive Care
Unit should make provisions for
proper authority, proper documentation, adequate prediction
criteria, and adequate patient
representation . If any of these
elements is missing, the rights of
critically ill patients may be compromised rather than enhanced.
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The Human Life Center
In his Divine Comedy, Dante spoke
of neutrals as "people who never were
alive." It was Socrates who said that
"the unexamined life is not worth living." Today we are witnessing a barrage of attacks on human life itself, be
they through abortion-euthanasia , increasing suicide, disrega rd for the aged
and unborn, subtle forms of discrimination, elimination of the poor and
"unfit," mandatory sterilization, Playboy-Playgirl sexual hedonism with its
accompanying VD, and a host of other
anti-life evils. Meanwhile, in Viktor
Frankl's words, " Man is born to ask
why he was born."
The Human Life Center aims to
explore and clarify all dimensions of
the human life issue - through research, workshops, life-long, learning
programs, consultations, dialogues, etc.
- at Minnesota's peaceful, quiet St.
John's University and in all parts of
the country,
Among subjects to be consider ed:
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Abortion-euthanasia; preparation for
marriage; marriage enrichment; care
of the aged and other segments of society; education and counseling in human sexuality and love; natural family
planning; parent effectiveness training;
death and dying. The resuscitation , research, defense, cultitvation, and promotion of vanishing Judeo-Christian
and human values will receive prime
attention and the widest propagation
from the spiritual, intell ectual, liturgi cal, and cultura l center that is Minnesota's St. John's Abbey and University.
Programs are being developed now
for June 8-20; June 12-15 ; June 20-22 ;
and June 29-July 2. Additional information on these programs and on
registration procedures are available
from:
Paul Marx, O.S.B., Director
The Human Life Center
Saint John's University
Collegeville, Minnesota 56321
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